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I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers must frequently decide whether to do a particular
act, such as accepting a client. This can be called a go/no-go deci-
sion. Lawyers must also frequently choose between alternative
projects, such as accepting client A rather than client B. This can
be called a conflicting-choice decision. When making both kinds of
decisions, lawyers (like decisionmakers in general) may lack infor-
mation on key components of the benefits or the costs of the
* Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Member
of the Illinois Bar.
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alternatives.
This Article discusses how, in the absence of accurate benefit-
cost information, lawyer decisionmaking can be more accurate. The
method involves determining a threshold value for each missing
component or set of components. In go/no-go decisions, if the per-
ceived value exceeds the threshold value, the decision should be
affirmative; otherwise, it should be negative. A similar analysis ap-
plies to conflicting-choice decisions.'
To illustrate threshold analysis, a good example is deciding
whether to accept a personal injury client on a contingent fee ba-
sis. One can reason by analogy to other go/no-go situations. The
client acceptance situation involves basically five variables:
1. The damages likely to be awarded (D); for example,
$10,000;
2. The probability of winning (P); for example, .60, which
means 6 out of 10 cases like this tend to win, and 4 out of
10 tend to lose;
3. The contingent fee rate (F), which is usually 33% or .33;
4. The number of hours the case is likely to take (H); for
example, 40; and
5. The dollar rate per hour at which the attorney values
his or her time (R); for example, $30.
In light of the above hypothetical data, the expected gross in-
come from this case would be $2,000 on the average. That amount
is arrived at by reasoning that if there were 10 cases like this, 6
would result in about $10,000 apiece in damages, and 4 would re-
sult in no liability and thus $0 in damages. If we add those 10
amounts, we get $60,000. If we divide by 10 for the average, we get
$6,000. We could arrive at the $6,000 amount more quickly by just
multiplying or discounting the $10,000 by .60, which is the
probability of the $10,000 being received. With that expected, dis-
counted, or average value of $6,000, we then apply or multiply the
.33 contingent fee to arrive at the $2,000 average gross income
from a case like this.
Continuing to use the above data, the expected expense in-
1. On threshold analysis in general, see B. BAIRD, INTRODUCTION TO DECISION ANALYSIS
415-45 (1978); E. BUFFA & J. DYER, MANAGEMENT SCIENCE/OPERATIONS RESEARCH 69-74
(1981); P. DASGUPTA, GUIDELINES FOR PRoJECT EVALUATION 250-59 (1972); C. MOORE, PROFIT-
ABLE APPLICATIONS OF THE BREAK-EVEN SYSTEM (1971); S. NAGEL, PUBLIC POLICY: GOALS,




volved in the case would be about $1,200. That simply represents
40 hours multiplied by the $30 rate per hour. There may be other
fixed costs such as office rent, but those costs must be paid regard-
less whether we accept this hypothetical client. There may be vari-
able costs besides the lawyer's time, but they tend to be less im-
portant, especially for illustrative purposes. If the expected income
is $2,000 and the expected expense is $1,200, this hypothetical case
involves an expected profit of $800.
II. Go/No-Go DECISIONS: HANDLING ONE MISSING VARIABLE AT A
TIME
A. Determining Predicted and Threshold Damages
To predict damages in a particular case, we can obtain data on
many previous cases of a similar type, add the damages awarded in
them, and divide by the number of cases. This kind of information
is available in loose-leaf services provided by research firms such as
the Jury Verdict Research Corporation. There are more sophisti-
cated prediction methods that classify cases by various precise
scales; there are also less sophisticated methods that rely on some
simple rule of thumb, such as multiplying actual medical expenses
or lost wages by a set factor. All the prediction methods, however,
generally have a substantial margin of error.
We need a method for making meaningful go/no-go decisions
when we are not certain what the damages awarded or some other
key components are likely to be. An especially useful approach is
to value all of the components that are relatively easy to assess,
and then determine the threshold value for the component that is
the most difficult to assess. Suppose that component in this case is
the damages (D) to be awarded. Determining a threshold value for
D involves the following steps:
1. Express the problem in terms of a threshold equation.
That equation defines a point where income equals
cost-a break-even point. In our example, the threshold
equation would be (D)(P)(F) = (H)(R):2 Expected income
is represented by the product of the damages, probability
of success, and contingent fee rate; expected cost is the
product of the hours of work involved and the hourly rate
2. Remember that D equals damages; P, the probability of winning; F, the contingent
fee rate; H, the number of hours the case is likely to take; and R, the dollar rate per hour at
which the attorney values his time. See supra p. 616.
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at which the lawyer values his time.
2. Substitute numbers for the variables for which we have
numerical information. That converts the equation into
(D)(.60)(.33) = (40)(30).
3. Isolate the unknown variable from the relatively known
ones. In this equation, that means dividing both sides of
the equation by (.60)(.33); doing so converts it to (D)--
(40)(30)/(.60)(.33).
4. Simplify the equation; the result is D* = $6,000. We put
a star next to D to show that it is the threshold value of
the damages awarded.
A threshold damages figure of $6,000 means that if the per-
ceived damages are greater than $6,000, we should take the case
because it promises to be profitable, assuming that the other
figures are reasonably accurate. If the perceived damages are less
than $6,000, we should reject the case as not being profitable. De-
ciding whether the damages are likely to exceed a given threshold
is generally easier than deciding exactly what the damages are
likely to be.
B. Determining Predicted and Threshold Probabilities of
Victory
To determine the probability of victory in a given case, we can
obtain data on many previous, similar cases and observe how many
of those cases were won by the party in the position of our client.
The probability of victory is the percentage of cases won by that
party expressed as a decimal. This kind of information is generally
available in the same loose-leaf services that provide information
on predicted damages. Nonetheless, a particular case probably can
be classified in a variety of categories, each with a different
probability of victory. Combining those probabilities may involve
sophisticated mathematical analysis. The probabilities usually can-
not be multiplied together because that implies each category is
independent. In reality, there may be varying degrees of overlap
among the categories. The loose-leaf services can be helpful in giv-
ing probabilities for frequently occurring combinations, but even
with that kind of good information, there may still be considerable
subjectivity in categorizing the cases.
In light of the difficulty of determining the probability of vic-
tory, this variable is usually the one that is most in need of thresh-
old analysis. Applying the same hypothetical variables used above,
[Vol. 36:615
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but treating the victory probability as our unknown, we can deter-
mine the threshold victory probability to be 36%. We arrive at
that figure by following the same general steps used to compute a
threshold damages figure. The first step is the same because the
threshold equation in this situation is (D)(P)(F) = (H)(R), regard-
less which variable we consider to be unknown. In the second step
we substitute numbers for the relatively certain variables, which
converts the equation into ($10,000)(.33)(P) = (40)(30). Next, we
express P in terms of the known facts, which means P = (40)(30)/
($10,000)(.33). Finally, we simplify the right side of that equation,
which reveals that the threshold probability of victory (P*) equals
.36. If we consider the probability of victory to be greater than one
in three, we should take the case, since the expected income out-
weighs the expected costs. If we consider the probability to be less
than one in three, we should reject the case.
No matter how rational we are in betting on the averages, we
can go wrong in any given case because individual cases are not
necessarily at the average. Our hypothetical case looks profitable to
the extent that the expected income is $800 more than the ex-
pected expense. Nevertheless, even if all our numbers are accurate,
we can still lose by taking the case since our numbers tell us that
four out of ten of these cases result in defeat for the party in our
client's position. On the average, however, it would make sense to
take these cases. If we have a large number of such potential cli-
ents, we will come out ahead by accepting them. Similarly, if we
have a small number of these cases, we may come out behind be-
cause we may be unlucky enough to have one of the losers. The
safest and most reasonable approach in any given case is to assume
that it is an average case unless we know otherwise.
C. Determining Threshold Contingent Fees
The .33 contingent fee rate was considered virtually fixed
before the United States Supreme Court held that bar associations
minimum fee schedules violated the antitrust laws.' Now those
rates and other lawyer fees can be set by individual lawyers in light
of profit-and-loss considerations. If a lawyer knows roughly the
damages, the victory probability, the hours, and the value per
hour, he can determine what contingent fee rate to charge to make
the case profitable. Treating the contingent fee rate (F) as the un-
3. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792-93 (1975); see also Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2475-76 (1982).
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known in the hypothetical data used above, we can determine the
threshold rate with the equation (F) = (H)(R)/(D)(P). When we
substitute the appropriate figures, the result becomes $1,200/
$6,000 or 1/5. Written as a decimal, the threshold contingent fee
rate is therefore 20%.
Knowing what the threshold contingent fee is can be useful to
a lawyer faced with a client who has been made an offer by another
lawyer. For example, in the above case the lawyer quotes the client
a .33 contingent fee. The potential client may say that he has been
offered a .25 contingent fee arrangement by a lawyer down the
street. As a competitive lawyer faced with the above facts, you
could offer a .20 contingent fee arrangement and still make the
case profitable. Some lawyers may consider it beneath their dignity
to vary their prices, but the legal profession is an increasingly com-
petitive one; threshold analysis, when the fee is the threshold vari-
able, enables lawyers to be competitive in a more systematic way.4
D. Determining Predicted, Threshold, and Optimum Hours
It would be helpful if the loose-leaf services also provided the
kind of information we need to determine the number of hours
necessary to handle a particular type of case. As of now, they only
provide information on damages awarded and probabilities of vic-
tory for various types of cases because that type of information is
available by analyzing court records. To determine how many
hours each side expended in a given case would require asking the
attorneys of record; they could probably provide that information
with reasonable accuracy, since most attorneys do keep good time
records. Attorneys in future cases could then estimate predicted
time consumption by checking the loose-leaf service in the same
way they check for predicted damages and probabilities. In the ab-
sence of such systematic information, attorneys tend to rely on
their personal experiences, their memories, and less systematic
ways of categorizing cases than a loose-leaf service might be able to
provide.
When the number of hours of work a particular case requires
is uncertain, one can make hours the threshold variable. Doing so
with our hypothetical data means determining the number of
4. For further discussion of the contingent fee client, see F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT
FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES (1964); Clermont & Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee,
63 Cornell L. Rev. 529 (1978); Nagel, Attorney Time Per Case: Finding an Optimum Level,
32 U. FLA. L. REV. 424 (1980); Schwartz & Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contin-
gent Fee in Personal Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (1970).
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hours by which $30 has to be multiplied to equal the $2,000 ex-
pected fee in this case. That means dividing $2,000 by $30. The
threshold number of hours is thus 67 hours. If the lawyer thinks
that this case is going to take more than 67 hours, he should reject
it.
The hours variable has a unique characteristic. It is the only
variable that has a causal influence on the other variables. The
number of hours that the lawyer spends on the case can influence
the damages awarded and the probability of victory. To determine
the optimum number of hours (as contrasted to the predicted or
threshold number of hours), we need an equation in which dam-
ages are statistically related to hours. We can formulate such an
equation by gathering data from many cases as to the damages
awarded, the victor, and the number of hours the attorney ex-
pended. We can then plot the relation between damages awarded
and hours expended on a two-dimensional graph. Doing so will
probably yield an S-shaped curve. At first, additional attorney
time has little effect on the damages award. As the time invested
increases, the curve gets steeper reflecting larger awards. Eventu-
ally the curve levels off as awards reach their theoretical
maximum.
A similar curve results when we relate victory probabilities to
hours expended. A composite curve can show predicted damages
awarded, discounted by predicted probabilities. One can superim-
pose that curve on a line relating time costs to hours expended.
That line should slope upwards as increased hours reflect a higher
aggregate cost. The optimum number of hours is at the point
where there is a maximum positive difference between the dis-
counted damages-awarded curve and the time-cost line. 5
E. Determining Actual, Threshold, and Derived Hourly Worth
The easiest way to determine one's hourly worth is to observe
what the market is paying for an hour of lawyer time in one's type
of law practice. That figure, however, represents what clients con-
sider the lawyer's time to be worth, not what the lawyer considers
his time to be worth to himself. A good test of how much a lawyer
considers his own time to be worth is to ask him how much he
would be willing to pay another lawyer to free him from an hour's
worth of work. If the market figure is $50 an hour, but a lawyer
would not buy an hour of free time for more than $30, he is effec-
5. See Nagel, supra note 4, at 428.
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tively saying that he considers his time to be worth about $30 an
hour.
Even if a lawyer is operating at the threshold in a case, he is
still coming out ahead if he is covering his hourly worth. A lawyer
in a contingent fee case wears two hats: one hat is that of a stock-
holder in himself who gets profits in a case only if the income ex-
ceeds the expenses; the other hat is that of a wage earner in the
firm who gets full wages if his labor expenses are covered, even
though the income in the case equals the expenses.
The hourly rate may be the least subjective of the five vari-
ables if it is determined by looking to the market rate. If the
hourly rate is questioned, one could determine the threshold rate.
In our hypothetical facts the threshold rate is $2,000 divided by 40
hours, or $50. The lawyer should take the case if he believes his
time to be worth less than $50 an hour.
We can also use this analysis to compute how lawyers value
their time. That might involve presenting lawyers with hypotheti-
cal cases and estimated time investment for each case. The lawyers
would then be asked whether they would accept the client in each
case. By observing which cases they accept, we can reason at what
rate they value their time. We could use the same analysis to de-
termine how lawyers perceive damages, probabilities, or hours. Re-
sults obtained through the use of this analysis with hypothetical
data will actually be more accurate than a guarded response to a
direct inquiry into the personal values of the lawyer.
III. Go/No-Go DECISIONS: HANDLING MORE THAN ONE MISSING
VARIABLE AT A TIME
A. Two Missing Variables
Often in go/no-go decisions such as accepting a contingent cli-
ent, there is only one variable to which threshold analysis is partic-
ularly applicable because that variable is especially difficult to as-
sess. There are, however, many situations when there are two or
more such variables. For example, in deciding whether to accept a
contingent client, we may be unable to predict with reasonable ac-
curacy either the damages awarded or the victory probability.
A good way to handle that problem is to draw a simple graph,
as in Figure 1, showing the relations between the two unknown
variables, while holding constant the known variables. The vertical
axis shows potential probabilities of victory (P), and the horizontal
axis shows the possible damages (D). We know the victory
[Vol. 36:615
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probability cannot be less than 0 or more than 1.00. We know the
damages variable cannot be less than 0, and we probably know
roughly its reasonable maximum; in this case it may be $20,000.













We also know that at the threshold the following statements
are true:
1. (P)(D)(F) = (H)(R) (the basic threshold equation);
2. (P)(D) = (H)(R)/F (isolating the unknown variables
on the left side of the equation);
3. (P)(D) = (40)($30)/(.333) (substituting our hypotheti-
cal data for the known variables);
4. (P)(D) = $3,600 (simplifying the right side); and
5. P = $3,600/D (expressing one unknown in terms of
the other)
With that last simple equation, we can substitute values for D
and determine the corresponding values for P. For example, when
1982]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
D is $3,600, P is 1.00. When D is twice $3,600 (or $7,200), P is .50.
Likewise, when D is four times $3,600 (or $14,400), P is .25. Each
of those three points is shown as an 'Y' on Figure 1. By connecting
those points together, we have a curve showing the relation be-
tween victory probability and damages when F = .33, H = 40, and
R = $30, and thus (H)(R)/F = $3,600. Note that the curve looks
like a child's slide, indicating that as the damages move up (i.e., to
the right), the victory probability goes down if we are going to con-
tinue to be at the threshold where income equals expenses. Like-
wise, as the victory probability goes up, the damages go down to
keep P times D equal to $3,600.
Note further that the upper right-hand corner of the graph is
where we would like to be because both the damages and the
probability of victory are high. That is the accept region. The
lower left-hand corner is where we would not like to be because the
damages and the probability of victory are low. That is the reject
region. The object now is to try to draw a big circle or other shape
on the graph where the combination of damages and victory
probability is likely to be. If that circle is mostly above the curve
showing (H)(R)/F = $3,600, then accept the client or adopt the go/
no-go project. If that circle is mostly below the curve showing
(H)(R)/F = $3,600, reject the client.
Thus, the problem reduces to a relatively simple graph that
can serve as a visual aid to determining whether P times D is more
or less than (H)(R)/F, even though we do not know the exact loca-
tion of P, D, or P times D. The same analysis can be applied to
situations where we do not know the value of any two of the five or
so variables. We simply go through the following more general
steps:
1. Draw a two dimensional graph showing one of the two
unknowns on the vertical axis and the other unknown on
the horizontal axis. Each axis should extend from the rea-
sonable minimum of the variable to the reasonable
maximum.
2. Express one of the two unknowns in terms of the other
while holding the relatively known variables constant, as
was done in the five steps above.
3. Use that equation to plot several points on the graph.
Connect the points together to create a threshold curve;
sometimes it may be a straight line. That curve shows the




4. Using that graph, try to approximate the location of the
combination of the two unknown variables. If that combi-
nation is on the accept side of the threshold curve, adopt
the project. If that combination is on the reject side, de-
cline the project.
B. Three or More Missing Variables
Suppose we change the problem to provide for three unknown
variables. The three most likely to be unknown are the damages,
the probablity of victory, and the hours needed to handle the case.
Should we accept a client in a .33 contingent fee case when we
consider our time to be worth $30 an hour, but when we do not
know the damages that are likely to be awarded, the probability of
victory, or the number of hours needed? That sounds like an im-
possible problem, with virtually no information on which to base a
decision.
Nevertheless, even this kind of problem may provide sufficient
latent information that can be gleaned through proper examina-
tion. The only change needed in Figure 1, which dealt with two
unknowns, is to draw a pair of threshold curves rather than a sin-
gle threshold curve.
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Drawing a pair of threshold curves requires an approximate idea of
the maximum number of hours (which in this case may be about
40 hours) and the minimum number of hours (which in this case
may be about 10 hours). At 10 hours, the (H)(R)/F amount is
(10)(30)/(.333), or $900. We can then plot a curve for P = $900/D,
just as we previously plotted a curve for P = $3,600/D, as is shown
in Figure 2. The two curves will be parallel: the upper curve will
correspond to the maximum value of H, and the lower curve will
correspond to H's minimum value. Note that as the number of
hours goes down, the reject region becomes smaller.
As before, the object now is to draw a big circle or other shape
on the graph where the combination of damages and victory
probability is likely to be. If that circle is mostly above the maxi-
mum hours curve, accept the client. If that circle is between the
minimum and maximum hours curves, we can assume that we are
operating near the threshold of zero profits. When dealing with
one, two, or three unknowns, we may sometimes find ourselves op-
erating at the threshold. Under those circumstances, we can either
flip a coin to decide, or we can seek additional information to as-
sess the variables more accurately.
Seldom is one faced with a go/no-go decision involving more
than three unknown variables. If there were a fourth unknown va-
riable in this client acceptance situation, it would probably be the
hourly rate. When we had one unknown variable, we talked in
terms of a threshold point. With two unknown variables, it was a
threshold curve. With three unknowns, it was a pair of threshold
curves or a threshold band. With four unknowns, we need two
graphs like the one in Figure 2. The first graph works with the
minimum value on the fourth variable, which might be $20 an
hour. The second graph works with the maximum value on the
fourth variable, which might be $50 an hour. We then draw our
rough circle on each graph as to where P and D might be. If the
circle is mostly in the accept regions on both graphs, we should
accept the client. If it is mostly in the reject regions, we should
reject the client. This kind of analysis can be extended to five or
more unknown variables by using two sets of paired graphs, rather
than just a pair of graphs, a band, a curve, or a point. Each set of
graphs works with a different minimum or maximum value for an
unknown variable. That, however, is primarily of academic inter-




IV. CONFLICTING-CHOICE DECISIONS: CHOOSING BETWEEN CLIENTS
OR PROJECTS
A. The Basic Comparisons
Conflicting-choice decisions involve more than one client or
project, as contrasted to go/no-go decisions that involve deciding
on a single client or a single project. When multiple clients or
projects are involved, one can apply a similar kind of threshold
analysis for making comparisons and for dealing with unknown
variables. Suppose we consider our previous hypothetical client to
be client A. We now want to introduce client B. This client's case
has the following characteristics:
1. Damages likely to be awarded are $16,000.
2. Probability of winning is about .20.
3. The contingent fee is still .33.
4. The number of hours is only 15.
5. Our hourly worth is still $30.
Assume that we have only 40 hours available. Which client
should we accept? We cannot accept them both, since that would
consume 55 hours and we only have 40 hours. At first glance, client
A looks like the better client because he generates a profit of $800
with $2,000 in expected gross income and $1,200 in expected ex-
penses. Client B generates a profit of only $606 with $1,056 in ex-
pected gross income and $450 in expected expenses.
We should note that with client B, however, we would have an
extra 25 hours available, since client B requires only 15 of our 40
hours. Client B would thus be the better client if we could invest
that remaining 25 hours to generate more than $194 profit. The
$194 is the difference between the $800 profit of client A and the
$606 profit of client B. In order for our remaining 25 hours to gen-
erate $194 in profit, those hours would have to average about $8
apiece in profit because $194 divided by 25 hours is about $8. That
means those hours would have to average $38 apiece in income be-
cause our time is worth $30 an hour. All this assumes we expend
the whole 25 hours to get the $194 threshold profit. We have a
threshold profit of $194 overall, a threshold profit of $8 an hour, a
threshold income per hour of about $38, and a threshold income of
about $950 overall (25 hours times $38). If the remaining 25 hours
can generate profit that will exceed those thresholds, client B is the
better client. With income and profit in this context, we can also
include the monetary value of the satisfaction we might get from
19821
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going fishing or doing non-lawyering things with that remaining 25
hours.
B. Missing Variables and Multiple Cases
We have just discussed choosing between clients when we have
complete information for each client on damages, victory
probability, contingent fee, hours, and hourly rate. Suppose one of
those five variables for either client is missing. What do we do
then? More specifically, suppose that we do not know the damages
for client B. An appropriate set of steps to follow would be:
1. Indicate the threshold equation when both clients are
equally profitable. In this context it is (D)(P)(F) - (H)(R)
= (d)(p)(f) - (h)(r), where the capital letters are the vari-
ables for client A, and the lower case letters are the vari-
ables for client B. The left side of the equation expresses
the profit for client A, and the right side expresses the
profit for client B.
2. Insert numbers for all the known information. Our hy-
pothetical figures convert the equation into
($10,000)(.60)(.33)-(40)($30) = (d)(.20)(.33) - (15)($30),
which simplifes to $800 = (d)(.066)-($450).
3. Isolate the unknown variable on the right side of the
equation, which reduces to d = $1250/.066.
4. Simplify the numbers on the left side of the equation.
We thereby obtain the threshold value of the unknown
damages: $18,750. This means that if the damages in client
B's case could somehow get above $18,750, instead of be-
ing $16,000, client B would be the more profitable client.
We can logically extend the above analysis to any missing variable
in the threshold equation of (D)(P)(F) - (H)(R) = (d)(p)(f) -
(h)(r).
We can also apply the analysis to two or more missing vari-
ables by using the same graphing approach for dealing with two
missing variables as was used in go/no-go decisions, as demon-
strated in Figure 3. Suppose, for example, that we do not know the
damages for either client A or B. Deciding which is the more prof-
itable client might involve the following steps:
1. Draw a two-dimensional graph with possible client A's
damages (D) on the vertical axis and possible client B's
damages (d) on the horizontal axis.
2. Express D in terms of d, holding constant all the other
[Vol. 36:615
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variables by inserting their numerical values into the
threshold equation. Doing that means working with a ba-
sic equation of the form (D)(.60)(.33) - (40)($30) =
(d)(.20)(.33) - (15)($30). It simplifies algebraically to D =
$3,787 + .33(d).
Choosing Between Two Clients-Two or More Missing Variables
$20,000- Prefer Client A
Des(D) $10,000- $10,387to ClientAI
$3,787





3. Plot a few points using that equation. Connect them to-
gether to form a threshold curve, which in this case is a
straight line. The upper left-hand corner of the graph is
the region for preferring client A, and the lower 'right-hand
corner is the region for preferring client B.
4. Try to draw a circle that encompasses where the combi-
nation of D and d are likely to be. If that circle is above
the threshold line, choose client A. If that circle is below
the threshold line, choose client B.
We can extend the above analysis to any pair of missing vari-
ables or any set of three or more missing variables using the same
general methods discussed under go/no-go decisions.
The analysis is also helpful when we are considering multiple
alternatives. Suppose, for example, that we have potential client C,
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and that we are still operating in the mutually exclusive context.
We can use the above comparison methods for choosing between
clients A and B. If client A is preferred, we compare client A with
client C. Whoever wins that comparison is the overall preferred cli-
ent. That same system of a series of successively paired compari-
sons can be applied to any number of cases or projects, with the
last uneliminated one being the preferred choice.
The above analysis involves mutually exclusive clients or
projects. An alternative and possibly more typical situation in-
volves choosing the best combination of clients or projects when
they are not mutually exclusive, but not all of them can be
adopted. A procedure for arriving at sound decisions in these situa-
tions is to:
1. Determine what all the possible combinations are;
2. Determine the expected income, expense, and profit for
each combination; and
3. Pick the combination that will be the most profitable.
This may require going through a set of paired compari-
sons using threshold analysis, because some of the combi-
nations may involve unknown variables and each combina-
tion may require a different number of hours or resources.
Simply picking the combination that is the most profitable by vir-
tue of their net profits is not prudent, just as it was not necessarily
wise to pick client A over client B simply because client A gener-
ates more profit than client B. As previously shown, client B could
be more profitable if client B involved fewer hours or resources
that could be invested elsewhere to yield enough profit to offset
the additional profit from client A. The same is true with combina-
tions of clients or projects.6
V. EXTENDING THE ANALYSIS TO OTHER FORMS OF LAWYER OR
JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING
We have examined threshold analysis mainly in the context of
accepting or rejecting a client, or choosing among clients. We have
also discussed choosing among projects on a broad level of general-
ity so as to make the analysis more widely applicable. There are
6. On conflicting-choice decisions in the context of choosing among cases, see S. NAGEL
& M. NEEr, DECISION THEORY AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 217-53 (1979); Forst & Borsi, A The-
oretical and Empirical Analysis of the Prosecutor, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 177 (1977); Landes, An
Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L. & EcoN. 61 (1971).
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many other examples that illustrate threshold analysis as applied
to the decisionmaking of lawyers and judges. Additional examples
include 1) deciding whether to accept a settlement or go to trial, 2)
deciding whether to release a criminal defendant or to hold him in
jail pending trial, and 3) deciding how to increase police adherence
to legality in making searches.
A. Deciding Whether to Accept a Settlement or Go to Trial
Lawyers frequently must decide whether to accept a settle-
ment or go to trial. The settlement offer is known. The results of
going to trial are not known. This becomes an excellent situation
for threshold analysis. An appropriate first step is to develop a
threshold equation. In its simplest form, the threshold equation
might be (S) = (P)(D).
This equation can apply to either the plaintiff or defendant in
personal injury cases or in criminal cases. The S stands for settle-
ment. The P stands for probability of plaintiff victory in either
type of case. The D could stand for a decision in either type of
case, or for damages in personal injury cases and detention-length
in criminal cases. In personal injury cases, S and D are expressed
in dollars. In criminal cases, S and D are expressed in terms of
months in jail. At the threshold, the settlement is exactly equal to
the expected value of going to trial.
To illustrate the application of this threshold equation to per-
sonal injury cases, suppose that as plaintiff's counsel, you are of-
fered a settlement of $8,000 in client A's case. Suppose further that
you perceive that if you try the case and win the damages awarded
are likely to be $10,000. What is the threshold probability of suc-
cess that would make the settlement worth accepting? Answering
that question (with the threshold equation in its simplest form)
involves:
1. Substituting numbers for the variables for which we
have information. That means an equation of the form
$8,000 =. (P)($10,000).
2. Isolating the unknown variable on the left side of the
equation. We then have P = $8,000/$10,000.
3. Simplifying the right side to determine the threshold
probability (P*), which in this case is .80.
Therefore, if the probability of success exceeds .80, counsel should
reject the settlement offer and proceed to trial. We can do the
same analysis when we know S and P, and we want to solve for
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threshold D; or when we know P and D, and we want to solve for
threshold S. Likewise, the same analysis can be done by counsel
for the defendant insurance company in deciding whether to give
in to the plaintiff's demand. In the client A situation, for example,
if defense counsel perceives the damages to be $10,000 and the vic-
tory probability to be .60, defense counsel should be willing to ac-
cept any settlement less than $6,000.
We can also illustrate the applicaton of that threshold equa-
tion to criminal cases. Suppose as the prosecutor you perceive that
if a particular case is won at trial, the sentence is likely to be 10
months. Suppose further that the defendant offers to plead guilty
for an 8-month sentence. What threshold probability would make
that plea bargain worth accepting? The analysis is the same except
that the first step is 8 months = (P)(10 months). The second step
is P = 8 months/10 months, and the third step is P* = .80. Just as
in personal injury cases, the threshold analysis can be extended to
any one of the three variables for either the prosecutor or the de-
fendant. We can also do a threshold analysis with two or more
missing variables, using the graphing approach discussed with go/
no-go decisions.
The basic threshold equation should be adjusted for litigation
costs. The plaintiff in either personal injury or criminal cases
would generally like to avoid going to trial because there may be
expensive fees involved in hiring a personal injury trial lawyer, or
there may be expensive administrative costs to the prosecutor's of-
fice. The plaintiff may therefore be willing to offer a reduction in
damages sought or the prosecutor a reduction in the charge or sen-
tence for early resolution of the case, in the same manner that a
seller offers a discount for early payment of an invoice.
From the plaintiff's perspective, the initial threshold equation
becomes (S) = (P)(D)(r), where r is the reduction factor (ex-
pressed as a decimal less than 1.00)-the amount remaining after
the plaintiff has discounted the expected value of the case to avoid
a trial. If, for example, the insurance company offers $4,000 and
the plaintiff perceives P to be .60 and D to be $10,000, the thresh-
old reduction factor is .67. We arrive at that figure by solving for r
in the equation, or by computing what discount has to be given to
$6,000 to convert it to $4,000.
The defendant also would generally prefer to avoid a trial. For
the criminal defendant, there may be a long wait in jail if he is not
released on bond, or there may be high administrative costs to the
public defender's office. The defendant may therefore be willing to
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offer an inducement for early resolution of the case in the manner
in which a buyer offers a bonus for early delivery of a needed prod-
uct. From the defendant's perspective, the initial threshold equa-
tion is (S) = (P)(D)(i), where i is the inducement factor (expressed
as a decimal greater than 1.00), which the defendant is willing to
add on to the expected value of the case to avoid a trial. If, for
example, the prosecutor offers a 9-month jail sentence in return for
a plea of guilty, and the defendant perceives P to be .60 and D to
be 10 months, the threshold inducement factor is 1.50. Again, we
arrive at that figure by solving for i in the equation, or by comput-
ing what factor multiplied by the perceived result of trial (6
months) will equal the settlement offer (9 months).
The basic threshold equation also needs to be adjusted for the
fact that a bird -in the hand may be worth two in the bush. In this
context that means that the right side of the threshold equation
needs to be discounted by the length of time we have to wait for
the trial results. In other words, a settlement offer of $5,000 may
be equal to a $7,500 expected value (i.e., (P)(D)) if we have to wait
five years to get the $7,500. This is so if we could invest the $5,000
to bring in $500 a year in profit. In order for $5,000 in principal to
make $500 a year in simple interest, the threshold interest rate
would have to be 10%. This means that our threshold equation
must be changed to read (S) = (P)(D)/[1+(RT)] where R is the
simple interest rate, and T is the number of years before the dam-
ages are received. The time-discounting factor in our case would be
1+(.10)(5), which equals 1.50.1
With that improved threshold equation, we can now determine
the threshold interest rate or the threshold number of years to
wait, as well as the threshold settlement, victory probability, and
damages. By definition, any one of those threshold figures causes
both sides of the equation to be equal. That means settling and
going to trial are equally profitable at the threshold. The time-dis-
counting factor for computing interest on the interest (i.e., com-
pound interest) is (1+R)T, instead of 1+(RT). The average per-
sonal injury case, however, does not involve enough money or delay
to make much difference between simple and compound interest.
The same kind of time-discounting analysis (although with more
subjectivity) can be applied to criminal cases because the average
defendant would rather take a seven and one-half month sentence
7. When $7,500 is divided by 1.50, it equals $5,000. Likewise, when $5,000 is multiplied
by 1.50, it equals $7,500.
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five years from now than have to go to prison for five months right
now.
8
B. Deciding Whether to Release or Hold a Defendant Before
Trial
Deciding whether to release or hold a criminal defendant
pending trial is an example of judicial decisionmaking to which
threshold analysis might apply. At the threshold, the costs of hold-
ing a defendant in jail (H) equal the costs of releasing the defen-
dant (R). The most important holding costs consist of whatever
cost society incurs as a result of the defendant being wrongly held
in jail when he would have appeared in court without committing a
crime had he been released. The probability that a defendant will
appear in court without committing a crime if released can be sym-
bolized as P. The releasing costs are whatever costs society incurs
as a result of the defendant committing a crime while released or
the defendant failing to appear for his court date. The probability
that a defendant will commit a crime while released or will fail to
appear can be symbolized as (1 - P); this is the complement of the
defendant appearing without committing a crime. Thus, the ex-
pected or discounted value of the holding costs is (H)(P), and the
expected value of the releasing costs is (R)(1 - P). At the threshold,
(H)(P) = (R)(1 - P).
To make the threshold equation more functional, we need to
determine the threshold probability above which the defendant is
released and below which he is held. That involves solving for P in
the threshold equation. If (H)(P) = R-(R)(P), then
(H)(P)+(R)(P) = R, and P(H+R) = R. Therefore, P*- R/
(H)+(R). A more convenient way of expressing the threshold
8. For further information on deciding whether to accept a settlement or go to trial, see
L. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT (1970); G. TULLOCK, THE LOGIC OF THE LAW 167-91 (1971);
Lachman & McLauchlan, Models of Plea Bargaining, in MODELING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 145-58 (S. Nagel ed. 1977); Friedman, An Analysis of Settlement, 22 STAN. L. REv.
67 (1969); Nagel & Neef, Plea Bargaining, Decision Theory, and Equilibrium Models (pts. 1
& 2), 51 IND. L.J. 987 (1976), 52 IND. L.J. 1 (1976); Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal
Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).
In addition to using (P)(D)(X) in the threshold equation for deciding whether to accept
a settlement or go to trial, one could use that method of conceptualizing the expected value
of going to trial in order to predict whether there will be a settlement or a trial. There will
be a settlement if the (P)(D)(X) of the defendant is greater than the (P)(D)(X) of the prose-
cutor or plaintiff. Otherwise, there will be a trial. Thus, when the (P)(D)(X) of the defen-
dant equals the (P)(D)(X) of the prosecutor or plaintiff, they are at the threshold between
settlement and trial. This is an example of using threshold analysis for predicting decisions,
rather than making decisions.
[Vol. 36:615
LAWYER DECISIONMAKING
probability that the defendant will appear in court without having
committed a crime is to first symbolize the ratio between the hold-
ing costs and the releasing costs (i.e., H/R) as X. Then we can
prove by simple algebra that P* = 1/(1-+X). We are effectively
making R equal to a value of 1. H is equal to a positive number
larger or smaller than 1, depending on the value of avoiding a
holding error relative to the value of avoiding a releasing error.
Using the threshold probability equation involves first decid-
ing the value of the holding-error costs (H) relative to the releas-
ing-error costs (R) in a given case. In the average case, the error of
wrongly holding a defendant who would appear without commit-
ting a crime should be considered more serious than the error of
releasing a defendant who then fails to appear or commits a crime.
Holding errors should be considered more serious than releasing
errors, just as wrongly convicting the innocent should be consid-
ered more serious than wrongly acquitting the guilty, although not
necessarily with the same ratio of seriousness. If in the average
case we consider the holding-error costs to be twice as serious as
the releasing-error costs, then H/R or X is equal to 2. This means
that in the average case, the threshold probability should be P*=
1/(1 + 2) = .33. That further means that if the average probability
of a defendant's appearing without committing a crime is greater
than .33, the defendant should be released on his own recognizance
or a low bond. If the defendant's P is less than .33, the defendant
should be held in jail or released only on a high bond. If the value
of X is 1.00 (meaning that H and R are equal), then P* is .50. One
can readily see how X can vary from case to case depending on the
individual defendant, and thus how P* can vary.
There is also a threshold value ratio between the holding-error
costs and the releasing-error costs. Suppose we assume that a given
defendant has a .90 probability of appearing without committing a
crime. With that probability, what is the threshold ratio of H to R,
above which we should release the defendant and below which we
should hold him? To calculate that threshold ratio, we solve for X
in the equation P*=1/(1 +X). Doing so tells us that X*= (1 - P)/
P. If we now substitute the known probability (P) of .90, we get X*
- (1-.90)/.90 = .10/.90 = .11. That means that if the defendant
has a .90 probability of appearing without commiting a crime, he
should be released unless we believe that the releasing costs are 9
times as great as the holding costs. Seldom is that likely to be the
case; this justifies releasing average defendants since they have a
high probability of appearing without committing a crime.
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The threshold equation used in this example of (H)(P) = R(1
- P) has analogous counterparts in other aspects of the legal pro-
cess. For example, the threshold equation for a juror deciding
whether to vote to convict or acquit is (C)(P) = (A)(1 - P). The C
represents the conviction-error costs, the A represents the acquit-
tal-error costs, and the P represents the probability that the defen-
dant is truly innocent.
Another example is the threshold equation for a would-be
criminal deciding whether to commit a crime. That threshold
equation is (C)(P) = (B)(1 - P). Here the C represents the costs of
unsuccessfully committing the crime, including imprisonment. The
B represents the benefits of successfully committing the crime and
the P represents the probability of the costs being imposed. That
kind of a threshold equation can be used to arrive at a threshold P,
C, B, or X (i.e., C/B). We can calculate the threshold value for any
variable in these threshold equations. Doing so can be helpful in 1)
making decisions with given values for some of the variables, 2)
influencing the decisions of other people such as would-be
criminals, 3) predicting decisions in light of changes that have been
known to occur in the values of some of the variables, or 4) mea-
suring an individual's decisional propensities by knowing the rela-
tive value he places on H and R, C and A, or C and B.'
C. Deciding How to Increase Police Legality in Making
Searches
The decisionmaking examples of out-of-court settlements and
pretrial release were basically go/no-go decisions. A good example
of a conflicting-choice decision might be deciding between the ex-
clusionary rule and legal action against the police as alternative
means of ensuring the legality of police searches while not unduly
9. For further details on deciding whether to release or hold a defendant in jail before
trial, see J. GOLDKAMP, Two CLASSES OP ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL AND DETENTION IN AMER-
ICAN JUSTICE (1979); Landes, The Bail System: An Economic Approach, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 79
(1973); Nagel, Neef & Schramm, Decision Theory and the Pretrial Release Decision in
Criminal Cases, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1433 (1977). On applying related threshold equations
to juror decisionmaking and the decisionmaking of would-be criminals, see S. NAGEL & M.
NEEF, supra note 6, at 187-215, 255-74.
In addition to using (H)(P) = (R)(1-P) for making decisions, one can also use that type
of threshold equation for influencing decisions. In other words, if we want to encourage
judges to do more releasing when in doubt, then we should try to 1) increase their percep-
tion of the holding costs, 2) decrease their perception and the reality of the releasing costs,
and 3) increase their perception and the reality of the probability of the defendant appear-
ing without committing a crime. Similarly, this kind of analysis can be applied to influence
the decisionmaking of jurors and would-be criminals.
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decreasing police morale. This is also a good example of potential
legislative decisionmaking in an area that affects lawyers, judges,
and the legal system.
In 1963 a survey was made of one randomly selected police
chief, prosecuting attorney, judge, defense attorney, and official of
the American Civil Liberties Union in nearly all of the fifty states
to determine, among other things, their perceptions of changes in
police behavior before and after the Supreme Court required ille-
gally seized evidence to be excluded from criminal proceedings."
Of those who responded from the states that had been newly re-
quired to exclude illegally seized evidence, 75% reported an in-
crease in police conformity to legal search procedures, and 25%
reported no change or a decrease. Of those who responded from
the control group of states that already had the exclusionary rule,
57% reported an increase in police adherence to legality, and 43%
reported no change or a decrease. The 18% difference between
75% and 57% can be used to measure the degree of relation (REL)
between newly adopting the exclusionary rule (E) and improve-
ment in police legality in making searches (L). Through the same
questionnaire and a similar analysis, we obtain three additional
relations:
1. The relation between adopting the exclusionary rule (E)
and showing a decrease in police morale in making
searches (M), which is .37 (REM).
2. The relation between the availability of legal action (A)
against the police making searches and increased police
adherence to legality (L), which is .05 (RAL).
3. The relation between the availability of legal action (A)
against police making searches and decreased police mo-
rale in making searches (M), which is .09 (RAM).
Suppose the goals of increasing legality and not decreasing
morale are considered equally important. How then, does one
phrase the threshold equation, when the exclusionary policy and
the legal action policy are equally profitable or desirable? A simple
way would be with an equation of the form REL - REM = RAL -
RAM. If we are unsure of any one of those four relations, we can
solve for its threshold value, and then try to answer the question as
to whether the relation is above or below that threshold value. For
10. The results of this survey are described in Nagel, Testing the Effects of Excluding
Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 283.
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example, perhaps we are unsure of the relation between E and L.
To solve for its threshold value we simply insert numbers for the
other relations and express REL in terms of those numbers: REL
= RAL - RAM+REM = (.05) - (.09)+(.37); the simplified result
is REL* = .33. If we are confident that the relation is stronger
than .33, the exclusionary rule should be adopted over the legal
action approach (assuming that legality and morale are our only
two concerns). If the relation is probably below .33, the exclusion-
ary rule should be rejected in favor of the legal action policy. That
threshold equation, which contains four variables, can be expanded
to contain eight variables by showing for each of those relations
the two percentages on which each one is based. We can then de-
termine the threshold value for any one of those percentages. The
threshold equation containing four variables can be contracted to
just the two variables of REL = REM, if we are only interested in
a go/no-go decision concerning the exclusionary rule.
Most people would say police conformity to legality in making
searches is more important than police morale. For the sake of dis-
cussion, let us assume that legality is 3 times as important as mo-
rale. That converts the threshold equation into (3)REL - REM =
(3)RAL - RAM. In other words, REL and RAL get multiplied by 3
because they involve the legality goal, and REM and RAM get
multiplied by 1 because they involve the morale goal.
If, however, we are not sure what the relative weight of legality
and morale should be, we can substitute a W for the 3, and then
solve for W to find the threshold weight. Doing so involves solving
for W in the equation W(.18) - (.37) = W(.05) - (.09). Isolating W
reveals that threshold W (or W*) is 2.15. If we consider legality to
be more than twice as valuable as morale (rounding to the nearest
whole number), we should prefer the exclusionary rule over legal
action, assuming we accept the four relations as being meaningful.
If we assume that legality is worth less than twice as much, we
should prefer the legal action. This assumes that the two policies
are mutually exclusive, or that there is an issue as to which is pref-
erable. The alternative would be to treat each option as a separate
go/no-go decision, which allows for adopting them both. There is
also no need to assume that the four relations or the relative
weights are precise. We can work with any combination of these
five variables as unknowns, and use the graphing methods dis-
cussed earlier to reach decisions with multiple unknowns.
Deciding how to increase police legality in making searches in-
volves a format that is common in both legal and general poli-
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cymaking. It is a format involving conflicting choices in which the
benefits and costs are expressed as decimals or statistical relations
with various goals. The relations with desired goals are expressed
as positive decimals, and the relations with undesired goals are ex-
pressed as negative decimals. Each decimal relation is weighted ac-
cording to the relative importance of the goal to which the relation
pertains, with the least important goal receiving a relative weight
of 1. With that kind of threshold analysis, the highly subjective
problem of assigning weights to goals can be greatly simplified by
making the goals relative rather than absolute, and especially by
working in terms of threshold weights rather than exact weights."
V. SOME CONCLUSIONS
The simple logic that this article proposes as a tool for lawyer
decisionmiaking can be summarized in a few basic rules:
1. When making a go/no-go decision, develop a threshold
equation in which the benefit variables are on the left side
and the cost variables are on the right side. Any one of
those variables can be considered a threshold variable by
expressing it in terms of the numerical values of the other
variables. Simplifying those numbers gives the threshold
value of the relatively unknown variable. We should adopt
the project if the unknown variable is a benefit and we
perceive its value to exceed the threshold; we should reject
the project when the variable is a cost and its value ex-
ceeds the threshold.
2. In order to reach a go/no-go decision with multiple un-
known variables, draw a two-dimensional graph with one
variable on the vertical axis and another variable on the
horizontal axis. Each axis should extend from the reasona-
ble minimum to the reasonable maximum of the variable.
Draw a curve which holds the other variables constant. If
the basic pair of unknown variables is above the threshold
curve, adopt the project; otherwise, reject it.
3. In order to resolve conflicting-choice decisions, develop
a threshold equation in which the benefits minus costs of
11. For further information on deciding how to increase legality in police searches, see
S. NAGEL, IMPROVING THE LEGAL PROCESS: EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVES 7-26 (1975); S. SCHLES-
INGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE: THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE (1977);
Nagel, supra note 10; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.
CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970).
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one choice are put on one side of the equation, and the
benefits minus costs of the second choice on the other.
Any one of those vairables can be treated as a threshold
vairable to be solved in terms of the numerical values of
the other variables. Any combination of unknown vari-
ables can be dealt with graphically as with go/no-go
decisions.
4. When many choices are involved, use a system of suc-
cessive paired comparisons; the last uneliminated option
will be the most preferred. These many choices can in-
clude combinations of choices, as well as the basic choices.
The four principles above can be applied to a great variety of
legal decisionmaking situations. General examples that have been
discussed include:
1. Deciding whether to accept a client on a contingent fee
basis when the threshold equation is (damages) x
(probability of victory) x (fee percentage) = (hours) x
(rate per hour), or (D)(P)(F) = (H)(R).
2. Choosing between two such conflicting clients when the
threshold equation is (D)(P)(F)-(H)(R) (for the first cli-
ent) = (d)(p)(f)-(h)(r) (for the second client).
3. Deciding whether to accept something of value that is
not contingent on the occurrence of an event versus some-
thing of value that is contingent on the occurrence of an
event such as the outcome of a trial. The threshold equa-
tion for those situations can be symbolized: (net benefits
from decision 1) = (net benefits from decision 2) x
(probability of those benefits being received), or (Bi)
(B2)(P).
4. Deciding between two alternatives when they are both
discounted by the probability of an event occurring or not
occurring, as when doing something can result in one type
of error, and doing the opposite can result in another type
of error. The threshold equation for those situations can
be symbolized: (type 1 error costs) x (probability of those
costs being imposed) = (type 2 error costs) x (complement
of the first probability), or (E1)(P) = (E2)(1-P). An illus-
trative example is deciding whether to hold a defendant in
jail pending trial.
5. Deciding between two alternatives when each one has a
statistical relation to certain desired and/or undesired
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goals and each goal varies in relative importance. The
threshold equation for those situations can be symbolized
as (WB)(RB)-(WC)(RC) (for the first alternative) =
(WB)(RB)-(WC)(RC) (for the second alternative), when
W = weight factor, B = benefit variable, R = relation
factor, and C = cost variable. The example given involved
comparing the rule excluding illegally seized evidence with
legal action against the police who make illegal searches as
alternative means of increasing the legality of police
searches, while not unduly decreasing police morale.
These five examples cover a great deal of legal decisionmaking.
All of these decisionmaking situations are conducive to reaping the
benefits of threshold analysis, such as greater effectiveness in
achieving desired goals and greater efficiency in reducing undesired
costs. Threshold analysis also enables lawyers to compete more
equally with each other regardless of natural decisionmaking skills.
To a considerable extent, the methods presented serve as the com-
mon sense that good legal decisionmakers intuitively use without
thinking in terms of formulas and equations. We need analyses of
good decisionmaking so that those who lack natural decisionmak-
ing skills can accomplish what good decisionmakers do intuitively.
Communication of the findings of the analyses to lawyers, judges,
legislators, and other legal decisionmakers will ultimately improve
the legal process.
19821
